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UNCLAIMING AND REBLAMING: MEDICAID WORK 
REQUIREMENTS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF HEALTH 
CARE ACCESS FOR THE WORKING POOR 
JULIE NOVKOV∗ 
This Essay will look at the imposition of Medicaid work requirements 
in states that expanded access to Medicaid under the Affordable Care Act 
(“ACA” or “the Act”).1  Poverty policy scholars have roundly criticized this 
development, which began in 2018 after the Trump Administration indicated 
its interest in receiving proposals for new programs.  This policy develop-
ment underlines and links several long-standing themes: Access to affordable 
health care is a privilege rather than a right; the poor can and should be di-
vided into deserving and undeserving categories; benefits provided to the 
poor need to be policed strictly to prevent fraud; and able-bodied adults 
should not be given any kind of support or benefit unless they are working 
for wages or actively seeking wage labor. 
But of equal importance, and inextricably intertwined with the policy 
change, is the implementation of work requirements through the use of auto-
mated systems.  This Essay will argue that understanding the shift to auto-
mation contributes to a stronger critique of work requirements.  As an integral 
part of work requirements, automation reverses the conventional structural 
process of naming, blaming, and claiming while simultaneously creating in-
juries.2  Automated systems remove human agents from decisionmaking, re-
configuring law’s violence in ways that sublimate and mask state actors’ in-
tent by shattering it into numerous individual pieces that cannot be tied to 
cognizable wrongdoers.3  Procedural due process becomes completely atten-
uated, utterly detached from what is happening to people.  The victims of 
these failures, as the only visible agents remaining, are left to carry the blame, 
and breakdowns and problems become an anticipated and expected part of 
the process. 
                                                        
© 2019 Julie Novkov. 
∗ Professor, Departments of Political Science and Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, 
University at Albany, SUNY.  The author thanks the participants at the 2019 Maryland Conference 
on Constitutional Law, as well as Virginia Eubanks, Patricia Strach, and Esra Gules-Guctas, who 
have inspired her with their passionate and informed consideration of digitization and policy reform.  
 1.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001–18122 (2012). 
 2.  See William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, 
Blaming, Claiming . . . , 15 L. & SOC’Y REV. 631, 631–654 (1980–81).  
 3.  As Professor Robert Cover has explained, law is a form of state power and inherently in-
corporates violence.  Administrative decisions as well as judicial decisions generate coercion and 
pain for their subjects.  Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986). 
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The stakes for grappling with these problems are high.  Working poor 
adults are the canaries in the coal mine not just for policy failures, but for 
failures of justice.  Compounding these failures stands to work continued in-
justice that carries down from generation to generation. And the failures will 
further pathologize poverty and those who must turn to Medicaid to address 
their medical needs. 
This Essay will proceed by providing some background on the rise of 
automation to administer government benefit programs and then explain the 
adoption of the ACA and the shift in the types of waivers solicited by the 
Trump Administration, using Kentucky’s story as an example.  It then will 
analyze the implementation of waivers in Arkansas, detailing the problems 
Medicaid recipients and program administrators faced.  The Essay then will 
address a series of lawsuits filed to challenge work requirements, noting that 
they have primarily focused on administrative interpretations of congres-
sional intent.  The Essay then will use the foregoing analysis to illustrate how 
the current framings of these challenges struggle to identify and acknowledge 
injuries wrought by automated systems.  The Essay will close by suggesting 
that legal analysts develop new models to identify digital wrongs and enable 
corrective action. 
A. A Little Background on Automation and Poverty 
Since the early 1970s, both the federal government and the states have 
increasingly relied upon computers and metrics to contain public spending 
with respect to welfare.4  Professor Virginia Eubanks describes the potent 
developmental process that produced the current environment.  The public 
interest litigation and the activism of the National Welfare Rights Organiza-
tion expanded welfare to incorporate black and brown recipients through the 
late 1960s and into the early 1970s.  Opponents of Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children’s (“AFDC”)5 expansion relied on racial stereotyping to re-
vive stigma against the poor, incorporating claims of fraud and waste in a 
toxic brew.6  In the wake of Goldberg v. Kelly7 and other rulings from the 
late Warren Court emphasizing procedural due process, state actors sought 
neutral, nondiscretionary means of managing and distributing benefits, rely-
ing increasingly on automated systems.  These systems, which Professor Eu-
                                                        
 4.  VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, 
POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR 33 (2017). 
 5.  42 U.S.C. §§ 601–44 (1994).  AFDC was the precursor to the current benefits system for 
poor families.  
 6.  EUBANKS, supra note 4, at 32–33.  
 7.  397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
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banks characterizes as “digital poorhouse[s],” eliminated discretion but ef-
fectively shrank public spending “by increasing scrutiny and surveillance of 
welfare recipients.”8 
The shift from AFDC to Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(“TANF”)9 exacerbated these problems.10  If AFDC was only precariously 
situated as an entitlement, TANF was designed to undercut any such expec-
tations.  The new system imposes lifetime eligibility limits and work require-
ments, restricts the use of benefits to support time spent pursuing higher ed-
ucation, and implements sanctions for noncompliance, including 
noncompliance with information-gathering initiatives.11  Tracking, manag-
ing, and imposing these sanctions relies upon automated and algorithmic sys-
tems, facilitating and enhancing “moralistic and punitive poverty manage-
ment strategies” while simultaneously removing individual agency and 
accountability for decisions.12  The digital dream—"high-tech tools that 
promise to help more people, more humanely, while promoting efficiency, 
identifying fraud, and containing costs”—repeatedly transforms into a night-
mare.13  While the tools themselves may be new, as Professor Eubanks ex-
plains, they operate within a deeply rooted framework designed to discipline 
the poor and maintain distinctions between deserving and undeserving poor 
people. 
Professor Eubanks’ work shows the complete disregard for the real hu-
man consequences of sloppy technological design and rushed implementa-
tion in her discussion of automating welfare eligibility processes in Indiana.14  
In 2006, Indiana Governor Mitch Daniels aggressively promoted an overhaul 
of the state’s welfare system to streamline the application process, identify 
and punish fraud, and privatize casework.15  The State selected a private co-
alition of companies led by IBM to engineer the transformation.16  Despite 
problems and failures in pilot programs, Indiana pressed forward with auto-
mation, producing horrific snarls of virtual paperwork and rampant errors.  
One Medicaid attorney in Bloomington estimated that ninety-five percent of 
applications submitted through the automated system produced eligibility er-
rors.17  Clients were denied and electronically removed from the system for 
                                                        
 8.  EUBANKS, supra note 4, at 33. 
 9.  Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, 2110 (codified as amended primarily in scattered sections of titles 7 and 
42 of the United States Code). 
 10.  See EUBANKS, supra note 4, at 36–37. 
 11.  Id. at 36. 
 12.  Id. at 37. 
 13.  Id. at 38. 
 14.  Id. at 39–54. 
 15.  Id. at 45. 
 16.  Id. at 48. 
 17.  Id. at 53. 
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failure to cooperate without being informed what specifically was wrong in 
their complicated applications for assistance.  Caseworkers’ jobs shifted rad-
ically from handling cases with which they were familiar to an entirely frag-
mented process that made them “slaves to the task system.”18 
B. Adoption of the Affordable Care Act and the Shift in the Waiver 
Program 
The adoption of the ACA produced the greatest changes in the American 
health care and health insurance system since at least the 1960s.  While most 
attention has focused on the debate over the ACA itself and Republican ef-
forts to repeal it, the Act incorporates a great deal of room for quieter inno-
vations that are taking place on the state level.19  For instance, the Act created 
the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Innovation (“CMMI”), which encour-
ages the development of “payment and delivery models that, ideally, will im-
prove health outcomes while controlling costs.”20  States wishing to engage 
in reforms can seek funding to design and implement State Innovation Mod-
els (“SIMs”) that state-level designers hope will be effective and applicable 
outside of the states that pilot them.21  While national policymakers intended 
this shift to emphasize pragmatic, flexible, evidence-based experimentation, 
it has produced results heavily beholden to the political contexts and coali-
tions in states that have volunteered to participate.22 
Other forms of flexibility and innovation under the ACA are even more 
problematic.  Under Medicaid generally and prior to the passage of the ACA, 
Congress had put into place a waiver process to allow “experimental, pilot, 
or demonstration projects in welfare and Medicaid.”23  The waiver process, 
contained in section 1115 of the original legislation, began initially as a 
means of solving minor implementation wrinkles, but has grown steadily 
since then.  By 2017, ten states were allocating three quarters or more of their 
Medicaid spending through programs for which they had obtained waivers. 24  
Several of these waivers, adopted prior to the 2016 election, allowed states 
to expand their Medicaid coverage beyond the new flexibility provided under 
                                                        
 18.  Id. at 63. 
 19.  Philip Rocco, Andrew S. Kelly & Ann C. Keller, Politics at the Cutting Edge: Intergov-
ernmental Policy Innovation in the Affordable Care Act, 48 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 425, 426 
(2018). 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id.  
 22.  See id. at 448. 
 23.  Carol S. Weissert & Matthew J. Uttermark, Glass Half Full: Decentralization in Health 
Policy, 49 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 199, 207 (2017). 
 24.  Id. at 208. 
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the ACA, providing assistance with health care premium payments.  Others 
adopted incentives to reward healthy behavior.25 
While these early ACA waivers reflected state-level political struggles, 
the Trump Administration additionally politicized the program by encourag-
ing states to use section 1115 waivers for a new purpose.  In 2017, Secretary 
of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), Tom Price, and the Administrator 
of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”), Seema Verma, 
sent a formal letter to state governors “ushering in a new era for the federal 
and state Medicaid partnership where states have more freedom”—the free-
dom being permission to reconfigure Medicaid to require employment, im-
pose premiums, penalize emergency room usage, and otherwise constrict 
coverage.26  Several states responded eagerly, imposing work requirements, 
time limits, drug tests, required premiums, and other changes reflecting not 
only a desire to cut costs, but also to impose a particular vision of the state’s 
responsibility to discipline the undeserving poor.27 
Kentucky was one of the first states to submit a request for a waiver in 
response to this invitation and was the first to receive approval.28  Kentucky 
had expanded Medicaid under the ACA and was widely trumpeted as a suc-
cess story, having produced one of the largest drops in the rate of uninsured 
residents in the country, from sixteen percent in 2013 to eight percent in 
2014.29  This drop in the uninsured rate was accompanied by increased use 
of outpatient services and preventative care, “reductions in emergency room 
use, and improved self-reported health.”30  Despite these outcomes, Ken-
tucky’s new governor, Matt Bevin, elected late in 2015 after campaigning 
against the new system, moved forward to dismantle Kentucky’s lauded 
state-based exchange and shift the state to the federal health care exchange.31  
The new Governor proposed drastically altering the earlier waiver that had 
expanded Medicaid coverage.  He advocated for replacing it with a new 
waiver program, Kentucky Helping to Engage and Achieve Long Term 
                                                        
 25.  MARYBETH MUSUMECI & ROBIN RUDOWITZ, KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE 
UNINSURED, THE ACA AND MEDICAID EXPANSION WAIVERS (2015), http://files.kff.org/attach-
ment/issue-brief-the-aca-and-medicaid-expansion-waivers. 
 26.  Weissert & Uttermark, supra note 23, at 208–09 (quoting Letter from Thomas E. Price, 
Sec’y, and Seema Verma, Ctrs. Medicare & Medicaid Servs. Adm’r, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., to all U.S. Governors, https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/sec-price-admin-verma-
ltr.pdf). 
 27.  Id. at 209. 
 28.  Keahna Akins, Prospective Policy Analysis of the Kentucky HEALTH Demonstration 
Waiver 1, 10 (Nov. 5, 2018) (unpublished M.P.H. Capstone Project, University of Kentucky), 
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1213&context=cph_etds. 
 29.  Id. at 1.  
 30.  Id. at 2. 
 31.  Id. 
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Health (“Kentucky HEALTH”) under section 1115.  HHS approved the pro-
posal in January 2018 with a scheduled implementation of July 1, 2018.32 
Kentucky HEALTH fundamentally changed the earlier waiver program 
that had increased benefits under the ACA.  For Kentuckians covered by 
Medicaid expansion, it eliminated dental and vision coverage and coverage 
for nonemergency transport, added an annual deductible, added an incentive 
account that rewarded enrollees for participating in “wellness” programs, dis-
enrolled certain beneficiaries for delinquent payment of premiums, and re-
quired all “able-bodied” adults to participate in “work activities.”33  Two 
weeks after the waiver was approved, the National Health Law Program, the 
Kentucky Equal Justice Center, and the Southern Poverty Law Center col-
laborated in filing a class action lawsuit on behalf of sixteen Kentucky resi-
dents who would be affected by the new program, seeking to block both the 
implementation of the waiver program and any imposition of work require-
ments.34 
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia relied on 
the Administrative Procedure Act35 to find that the waiver granted to imple-
ment Kentucky HEALTH was inappropriate.36  In the court’s understanding, 
the new program failed because it did not promote the core objectives of 
Medicaid, a key threshold for any program requiring a waiver.37  While the 
court embraced a deferential standard of review, it agreed with the plaintiffs 
that the central purpose of Medicaid is “to provide coverage and care to the 
most vulnerable” and, moreover, “to provide that care generally free of 
charge.”38  The court relied both on Medicaid’s original authorization and the 
2010 expansion under ACA to reach this conclusion, and found that the Sec-
retary, in granting the waiver, had failed to ask two critical questions: 
Whether the new program “would cause recipients to lose coverage,” and 
whether it would “help promote coverage.”39  In the court’s comprehensive 
factual analysis, which relied on expert health policy amici, the new program 
would drastically slash the state’s Medicaid rolls and “reduce health coverage 
for low-income individuals.”40  The court also mentioned that the new ad-
ministrative system would likely “increase ‘clerical and tracking errors and 
delays,’ which in turn would ‘cause inadvertent terminations.’”41 
                                                        
 32.  Id. at 3. 
 33.  Id. at 4–5. 
 34.  Id. at 5. 
 35.  5 U.S.C. §§ 551–706 (2018). 
 36.  Stewart v. Azar, 313 F. Supp. 3d. 237, 272 (D.D.C. 2018) [hereinafter Stewart I] (referring 
to the waiver approval as “arbitrary and capricious”).  
 37.  Id. at 265. 
 38.  Id. at 259–60. 
 39.  Id. at 262. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. at 263. 
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The possibility of lost coverage by design or through the implementa-
tion of new delivery systems was critical to the court because, as the opinion 
emphasized, Congress’s purpose in providing health insurance was not to 
promote health, but to make health care more affordable.42  The court con-
sidered the meaning of expansion, finding that ACA’s expansion of Medicaid 
to all individuals below prescribed income levels placed them on the same 
footing as previously covered vulnerable populations.43  The Secretary of 
HHS’s reliance on tangential factors—improving health outcomes, lowering 
costs, and fostering self-sufficiency—when determining if waiver was appro-
priate, supplanted focus on the primary goals of the program.44  Thus, the 
court concluded the approval of the waiver was arbitrary and capricious.45  
The court, therefore, prevented the program from going into effect.46 
This victory, significant as it was, had limits.  Kentucky simply reap-
plied for the waiver.  After receiving more than 11,500 comments, more than 
8500 of which criticized the work requirement, CMMS again approved the 
waiver.47  Kentucky set things in motion to implement the program on April 
1, 2019, but the same plaintiffs filed suit again, alleging that the Secretary of 
HHS still failed to address the threat of mass loss of coverage.48  To this 
claim, they further alleged that Kentucky’s threat to end coverage for those 
who had obtained it through Medicaid expansion produced additional statu-
tory concerns.49  In the end, despite the additional round of consideration, the 
district court again found the program’s approval by the Secretary was im-
proper because the Secretary did not show that the new program “promotes 
the objectives of the Medicaid Act.”50 
While the Secretary agreed that the central purpose of Medicaid was to 
“furnish medical assistance to the populations covered by the Act,” including 
those brought in under the ACA, he argued that the Medicaid Act had three 
additional objectives: advancing health and wellness, “increas[ing] benefi-
ciaries’ financial independence,” and “ensur[ing] the fiscal sustainability” of 
                                                        
 42.  Id. at 267.  
 43.  Id. at 269. 
 44.  Id. at 272. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. at 274.  The State of Kentucky, dissatisfied with the legal challenge, filed its own law-
suit against the Stewart I plaintiffs, claiming that enjoining Kentucky HEALTH constituted a legally 
cognizable injury because Kentucky would be forced to “un-expand” Medicaid.  Bevin ex rel. 
Kentucky v. Stewart, No. 3:18-cv-00008-GFVT, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140394, at *11 (E.D. Ky. 
Aug. 20, 2018). 
 47.  Darla Carter, Updated: Kentucky’s Medicaid Overhaul Approved, INSIDER LOUISVILLE 
(Nov. 20, 2018, 7:57 PM), https://insiderlouisville.com/health/kentuckys-medicaid-overhaul-ap-
proved/. 
 48.  Stewart v. Azar, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125, 131 (D.D.C. 2019) [hereinafter Stewart II]. 
 49.  Id. at 136. 
 50.  Id. at 137. 
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Medicaid generally.51  The waiver, the Secretary claimed, was justified be-
cause the State had claimed that it advanced these objectives.  The district 
court disagreed with this analysis.  While the Secretary provided some anal-
ysis of the Act’s core purpose of furnishing medical assistance, the court held 
that the Secretary had not adequately analyzed the coverage question.  The 
real possibility, even under Kentucky’s conservative estimate, that 95,000 
individuals would lose access to coverage did not receive enough considera-
tion.52  The court likewise rejected the Secretary’s contention that the promo-
tion of health and financial self-sufficiency were purposes either of the leg-
islation authorizing Medicaid or of the ACA.53 
The State also defended the reapproval of the waiver based on Kentucky 
Governor Matt Bevin’s reaction to the first lawsuit, Stewart v. Azar54 (“Stew-
art I”).  After the first waiver was invalidated, the Governor announced that 
if the Kentucky HEALTH program, with its mechanisms for reducing Medi-
caid use, did not go into effect, he would use his executive authority to roll 
back Kentucky’s participation in Medicaid expansion.55  The Secretary used 
this pronouncement to support his own original argument that financial sus-
tainability for the State was a relevant consideration.  If Kentucky opted to 
terminate expansion because of cost, the Secretary reasoned, Kentuckians 
would be worse off than if the demonstration waiver were approved, even 
though the waiver had cost-control provisions incorporated.56  But the court 
rejected this line of reasoning, finding that a threat to de-expand Medicaid 
could not be used to circumvent the usual analysis of whether the government 
had appropriately taken into account the core purposes of Medicaid in ap-
proving or denying a waiver application.57 
Since the Kentucky litigation began, HHS has approved section 1115 
waivers for demonstration programs imposing work requirements in several 
other states.  Five states—Arizona, Michigan, Ohio, Utah, and Wisconsin—
have not yet implemented these programs.58  Nineteen other states have ap-
plications pending.59  Thus far, only Arkansas and Indiana have implemented 
their requirements, though, as discussed below, Arkansas’s implementation 
                                                        
 51.  Id. at 139 (emphasis omitted). 
 52.  Id. at 140. 
 53.  Id. at 143–48. 
 54.  313 F. Supp. 3d 237 (D.D.C. 2018). 
 55.  Darla Carter, Oral Arguments Scheduled in Lawsuit Challenging Kentucky’s Medicaid 
Overhaul, INSIDER LOUISVILLE (Feb. 20, 2019, 1:00 PM), https://insiderlouisville.com/health/oral-
arguments-scheduled-in-lawsuit-challenging-kentuckys-medicaid-overhaul/. 
 56.  See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 140. 
 57.  Id. at 154. 
 58.  Medicaid Waiver Tracker: Approved and Pending Section 1115 Waivers by State, KAISER 
FAMILY FOUND. (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/medicaid-waiver-tracker-
approved-and-pending-section-1115-waivers-by-state/. 
 59.  Id. 
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has been put on hold.60  Indiana’s work requirement went into effect in 2019, 
but the program does not require hours in the first six months.61  Individuals 
receiving Medicaid in Indiana will have to demonstrate five hours per week 
beginning in months seven through nine of the program, with increases to 
follow.62  Arkansas, however, put its work requirements into place, drawing 
intense national scrutiny—as well as criticism and more litigation, ultimately 
resulting in an injunction stalling implementation.63 
C. Arkansas as a Digital Implementation Laboratory 
A prospective analysis published by the Urban Institute in May 2018 
gave a fairly clear picture of what to expect when the Arkansas waiver pro-
gram, Arkansas Works, was implemented.64  The Arkansas Works program 
required most able-bodied adults to work eighty hours per month or engage 
in other qualifying activities in order to be eligible for Medicaid coverage.65  
The Urban Institute’s study used Arkansas’s demographic information and 
survey data collected from Medicaid enrollees to identify anticipated prob-
lems for enrollees who would likely be subject to the work requirement but 
were not employed.66  The study estimated an enrollment rate of approxi-
mately 269,000 non-disabled working age individuals in the state, with sev-
enty-four percent likely to be exempt from work requirements, twelve per-
cent subject to the requirements but already employed, and the remaining 
fifteen percent (approximately 39,000 people) potentially nonexempt but not 
working.67 
Despite concerns about the new system, its phased rollout began on June 
5, 2018.68  The new system required significantly more information about 
Medicaid recipients than Arkansas had previously required to determine their 
appropriate categorization.  The Arkansas Department of Human Services 
informed enrollees about upcoming changes, alerting them that “[s]ome peo-
ple . . . have to participate in work activities to keep their health insurance 
coverage.  Those people will have to report work activities to DHS. . . .  DHS 
                                                        
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. at n.5 (“While Indiana began implementation of the work requirement in 2019, no hours 
are required in the first [six] months.”). 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. at n.4.  
 64.  ANUJ GANGOPADHYAYA ET AL., URBAN INST., MEDICAID WORK REQUIREMENTS IN 
ARKANSAS: WHO COULD BE AFFECTED, AND WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT THEM? (2018), 
https://www.urban.org/research/publication/medicaid-work-requirements-arkansas/view/full_re-
port. 
 65.  Id. at 5. 
 66.  Id. at 7. 
 67.  Id. at 3. 
 68.  Louise Norris, Arkansas and the ACA’s Medicaid Expansion, HEALTHINSURANCE.ORG 
(Oct. 14, 2019), https://www.healthinsurance.org/arkansas-medicaid. 
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decides if you have to report work activities.  DHS needs some information 
from you to decide that.”69  New Medicaid applicants under the waiver sys-
tem were required to answer a battery of questions designed to determine 
whether they fell into one of the exemption categories.70 
The Urban Institute’s pre-implementation study identified potential bar-
riers to fulfilling the reporting requirements, including not having internet 
access in the household, not having access to a vehicle, having less than a 
high school education, and either having or living with “a household member 
with a serious health limitation.”71  Even the group likely to experience the 
least difficulty with the reporting requirements—those who were potentially 
nonexempt but holding down a job successfully—faced barriers, with fifty-
four percent having at least one of these situations.72  Of the individuals not 
employed but likely to be required to work, nearly a third had no internet 
access at home, and seventy-eight percent of them experienced one or more 
of the identified barriers.73 
The Urban Institute had correctly predicted that nonexempt individuals 
who were not employed were likely to have difficulty “comply[ing] with the 
state’s new work requirements, especially if the state does not make new in-
vestments in job training, job search assistance, employment supports, and 
related services (which cannot be financed by Medicaid).”74  More omi-
nously, even individuals exempt from the new requirements and those meet-
ing them were likely to have problems, because they “have characteristics 
that may make it difficult for them to navigate the administrative processes 
established to enforce work requirements, thus putting them at risk of losing 
or failing to obtain Medicaid coverage even if [they are eligible] . . . possibly 
leading to coverage losses among people that the waiver is not intended to 
affect.”75 Of course, these projections would have been no surprise to anyone 
aware of Indiana’s experience with automating welfare reform in 2006, dis-
cussed in the introduction to this essay.76 
As in Indiana, neither concerns about the drastic nature of the changes 
proposed in Arkansas nor about the logistics of implementing automated re-
porting in Arkansas gave pause to implementation.  Arkansas put Arkansas 
Works into place with the hope that it would prove an efficient and effective 
                                                        
 69.  GANGOPADHYAYA ET AL., supra note 64, at 4–5 (quoting DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., 
WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE WORK REQUIREMENT 1, http://news.arkansasblue-
cross.com/docs/librariesprovider4/default-document-library/program-
flyer_aw.pdf?sfvrsn=5c076afd_0 (last accessed May 21, 2018)). 
 70.  Id. at 9. 
 71.  Id. at 4.  
 72.  Id. at 18. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. at 23. 
 75. Id. 
 76.  See notes 29–57 and accompanying text. 
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means of providing access to services for the deserving, cut costs, and reduce 
fraud.  Advocates for the poor in Arkansas readily found nine plaintiffs to 
challenge the program, eight of whom were enrolled in Medicaid, and one of 
whom was disenrolled because he failed to comply with the work reporting 
requirements.77 
The organized group of plaintiffs filed suit in November 2018.  The suit 
noted the technical problems as one argument against the work requirement, 
but primarily challenged the Secretary’s exercise of discretion in granting the 
waiver.  While targeting Arkansas’s program specifically, the broad frame of 
the suit alleged that the Trump Administration’s invitation of waiver pro-
posals seeks “to bypass the legislative process and act unilaterally to funda-
mentally transform Medicaid.”78  The plaintiffs characterized the implemen-
tation of the waiver program as “catastrophic,” having stripped more than 
8400 individuals of access to health care in just a few months and placing 
“thousands more” at risk.79  While Arkansas had embraced Medicaid expan-
sion under the ACA, the state had also initially requested a waiver at that time 
to impose a work requirement, which was denied by the administrative lead-
ership of HHS during the Obama Administration. 
The suit alleged that under the ACA, once a state has elected to expand 
Medicaid coverage, it may not treat enrollees differently, it is forbidden from 
imposing additional eligibility requirements, and it must ensure that all eligi-
ble people who apply for coverage “are served and get coverage.”80  Follow-
ing the lead of the successful litigation in Kentucky, the suit challenged the 
granting of the waiver on the ground that the Secretary’s authority to grant 
waivers only extends to states that will promote the objectives of the Medi-
caid Act (as amended by the ACA).81  The lawsuit characterized the Secre-
tary’s solicitation of new proposals, the CMS Administrator’s issuance of 
waivers, and the Arkansas government’s characterization of the program’s 
goals as a “fundamental[] transform[ation]” of Medicaid.82  Transformation, 
however, is a legislative power, not one that the executive branch can exer-
cise administratively under cover of executing the laws faithfully.83  The 
plaintiffs argued that the purposes of Medicaid and the ACA—to ensure ac-
cess to coverage—were completely subverted by the waiver program, which 
rendered coverage much more difficult to maintain for the expansion popu-
lation. 
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In the course of making the statutory and constitutional claims, the law-
suit alleged that the technological system developed to manage the waiver 
program was itself part of the problem because of its role in making access 
difficult.  To contain costs, the work and community engagement require-
ment was limited to individual online reporting, even though the ACA re-
quired that individuals be permitted to submit information relating to eligi-
bility in person, by telephone, or through the internet.84  The system might 
best be described as cumbersome; at worst, it seemed intentionally designed 
to be obstructive.  “To use the online portal, enrollees need[ed] an email ad-
dress, a log-in and password unique to the portal, and a reference number 
provided in a multi-page letter sent by DHS.  Enrollees use[d] the reference 
number to link their insurance account to the reporting portal.”85  Once the 
link between the enrollee’s insurance account and the portal was established, 
it did not have to be reentered each month, but even after portal access was 
secured, enrollees had to navigate through multiple screens to report activi-
ties that establish compliance with the work requirements.86  Furthermore, 
the portal, which was available only between 7:00 AM and 9:00 PM, was 
occasionally entirely inaccessible due to scheduled maintenance during these 
hours.87  The stakes for failing to master the system were high.  Failure to 
report work activities for a given month by the fifth date of the following 
month excluded any unreported activities from counting toward compliance. 
Enrollees were also expected to navigate the online portal to claim ex-
emption from the work requirement.  Here, too, the stakes were high for er-
rors.  Periodic review of exemption attestations and compliance reports “may 
result in retroactive removal of months of exemption or compliance.”88  If 
these removals resulted in a finding that an enrollee had failed to comply for 
three months, the enrollee’s insurance was canceled, and the case was re-
ferred for investigation for fraud and pursuit of repayment of benefits.  Insur-
ance cancellation also led to the exclusion of the cancelled individual from 
the system for an entire year, even if there was no finding of fraud.89 
The plaintiffs all alleged experiences with navigating the system that 
ranged from frustrating to Kafkaesque.  Take Adrian McGonigal, a forty-
year-old resident of Pea Ridge, Arkansas, for example.90  A Medicaid enrol-
lee since 2014, diagnosed with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease 
(“COPD”), Mr. McGonigal received notice in June 2018 that the new work 
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requirement would apply to him.  He called DHS to report that he was em-
ployed at McDonald’s but was informed that only online reports were ac-
cepted.  Because he did not own a computer or smartphone, he had no ready 
access to the internet, and his lack of a driver’s license left him dependent on 
public transportation to get to the nearest public library to complete the re-
port.  With assistance from his family, Mr. McGonigal was able to report his 
work hours in June 2018.91  Relieved, he believed he had completed the re-
quirement, and did not understand that he had to keep reporting.92 
In August 2018, he also got a new job with Southwest Poultry.93  He 
was initially assigned to work in the chicken processing department but found 
that the chemicals in his new work environment aggravated his COPD.  The 
company moved him to the shipping department and his condition improved, 
enabling him to work between thirty and forty hours per week.94  However, 
when he went to the pharmacy on October 5 to fill a prescription for his 
COPD, he discovered that his coverage had been terminated.  Unable to pay 
the $800 cost, he left without his medication.95 
Mr. McGonigal then entered into a round of frustrating communications 
to try to understand what had happened.96  He called DHS, which referred 
him to his insurance company.  In return, his insurance company referred him 
back to DHS.  After securing representation from Legal Aid, he learned on 
October 19 that his coverage had been terminated for failure to report his 
work hours and he would not be eligible to resume coverage until the next 
calendar year.97  Only when he protested that he had indeed reported his em-
ployment and cited the letter he had received in June acknowledging his re-
port did he learn that his coverage had been canceled for failing to report his 
work hours every month.  Ultimately, a DHS administrator granted him a 
good cause exemption on October 31, 2018, despite the fact that neither his 
lack of a permanent address nor his poor health, cited as reasons, were valid 
extenuating circumstances according to DHS policy.98 
Unfortunately for Mr. McGonigal, while he was struggling to get his 
coverage restored, he could not afford the medications that controlled his 
COPD.  After a trip to the emergency room, he missed several days of work, 
recovering at home because the hospital would not keep him as an uninsured 
patient.  On October 22, citing his absenteeism, Southwest Poultry fired 
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him.99  At the time of the filing, he was unemployed; the filing described him 
as “unsure how he will keep his coverage given that he no longer has a job 
and does not know how he will be able to meet the work or reporting require-
ments.”100 
Other plaintiffs had unique struggles with the waiver program, but com-
mon themes across their experiences were preexisting poor health, marginal 
work records that, for many, intertwined with their health struggles, and dif-
ficulty in understanding and using the electronic system for reporting work 
hours.101  Of course, one can presume the plaintiffs were chosen as particu-
larly poignant examples of the problems the waiver system created, and the 
organizations that selected them sought individuals who had tried to comply 
with the new requirements.  Broader consideration of the program, however, 
suggests that their experiences were not unusual either in their efforts to com-
ply with both the work and reporting requirements or in their inability to do 
so.102 
The State’s own records indicate that the program triggered significant 
coverage losses for noncompliance.  The new rules implemented in June 
2018 mandated termination from Medicaid after three months of not meeting 
the work and reporting requirements and enforced termination first against 
individuals between thirty and forty-nine years old.103  At the end of August, 
the automated system flagged noncompliant individuals, and 4300 Arkansans 
became the first Americans to lose Medicaid coverage for failing to report 
sufficient work or work-related activities.104  By the end of the year, more 
than 18,000 adults had lost coverage.105  Of the clients who did not meet the 
work (or alternative) requirements in each month from June through Decem-
ber, almost all did so because they reported no work activities, suggesting 
significant barriers to successful navigation of the automated system.106 
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A Kaiser Family Foundation analysis published in October 2018, which 
reported the initial alarming drop in Medicaid recipients in Arkansas, at-
tributed the drop to the state’s difficulties with informing people about the 
changes and managing the system, both of which implicate technology.107  In 
discussing outreach efforts, the report presents a paradox, claiming that 
“[d]espite a robust outreach campaign conducted by the state, health plans, 
providers, and beneficiary advocates, many enrollees have not been success-
fully contacted.”108  The State relied primarily on telephone calls to relay 
information individually, but over half of enrollees did not have a telephone 
number listed in the state’s database, many had incorrect listings, and many 
who were reached did not respond to the calls or voicemails.109  The State 
partnered with a nonprofit organization, the Arkansas Foundation for Medi-
cal Care, to conduct outreach work, but the State’s requirements for contact 
did not come close to covering all enrollees.  For example, little effort was 
made to conduct outreach in any language other than English.110 
As problematic as outreach was, the enrollment system was even more 
of a barrier.  The anticipated problems with creating an online account, which 
required linking the online profile to a unique identifier number, materialized 
rapidly.  The online reporting requirement, unique to Arkansas, demanded 
securing access through a fourteen-step process.111  Users reported that the 
portal design was not mobile-friendly, though many enrollees only had inter-
net access through their cell phones.  To overcome the barriers created by 
lack of internet access and computer literacy, the waiver program allowed 
“registered reporters” to allow enrollees “to designate a third party to create 
their online accounts and access the portal to do their reporting.”112  Health 
plans and providers could designate staff to serve in this role, but few enrol-
lees chose this option, and no funds were provided to educate either providers 
or enrollees about how to use the portal.113 
The Kaiser Family Foundation analysis revealed that of the approxi-
mately 60,000 individuals who became subject to the new work requirements 
in August, more than 16,000 did not report the minimum required eighty 
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hours of qualifying work activities.114  The study could not definitively ex-
plain the reasons for these failures, but speculated that enrollees had difficulty 
creating and linking their accounts or reporting their work hours through the 
portal, concluding that “[n]on-compliance with the new requirements to date 
is attributed to lack of knowledge about the complex new requirements.”115 
The system did better in identifying enrollees who were exempt from 
the work reporting requirements, using data matching to verify that around 
two-thirds fell into one of the exempt categories.  Enrollees not identified, 
though, had to report their justifications for exemption through the system.  
As the Kaiser Family Foundation analysis noted, the system required 
“[eleven] separate steps to report volunteer hours or to report an exemption 
based on pregnancy.”116  Here too, the complexity of the rules and the diffi-
culty of navigating the portal took a significant toll.  To add to the structural 
problems, technical problems cropped up, including a statewide computer 
outage on September 5, 2018, the deadline for reporting August hours, and 
the first deadline with the potential penalty of cancellation of benefits.117  In 
addition to the system-wide failure: 
Internet and cell phone connectivity, especially in rural areas, can 
be slow and unreliable, which can translate to problems with re-
porting.  One interviewee cited multiple examples of enrollees hav-
ing difficulty linking their online accounts because the reference 
number provided in the notice did not work or they did not receive 
the notice with the reference number.118 
For those not automatically identified as exempt, the system placed the 
burden on enrollees to determine their status, and the early experience of im-
plementation revealed perplexing gaps.  “Exemptions unlikely to be identi-
fied . . . include caring for an incapacitated person or experiencing a short-
term incapacity, pregnancy, participation in an alcohol or drug treatment pro-
gram, and full-time students.”119  The “medically frail” exemption was also 
particularly challenging for individuals with mental health needs, and indi-
viduals with disabilities by and large were not seeking accommodations.120 
While the Kaiser Family Foundation analysis remarks that both research 
and interviews support the idea that promoting work for enrollees is valuable, 
it concludes that “the waiver design . . . tie[d] compliance to coverage, re-
quire[d] monthly online reporting and provide[d] no additional resources for 
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work supports,” producing unintended and largely negative consequences. 121  
Even as early as September 2018, researchers could see that the State had 
underestimated the complexity of implementing the changes, particularly the 
transition to an entirely online system, and had failed to provide adequate 
resources to manage either the transition or the operation of the new system.  
While technology facilitated tracking things like efforts to reach out to enrol-
lees and potential enrollees, electronic outreach was ineffective for enrollees 
without stable addresses, phone numbers, or internet access.122  These enrol-
lees are by and large the most vulnerable and in need of assistance—and least 
likely to hear about the changes or be able to navigate them successfully. 
Early evidence shows that enrollees were indeed losing access to cover-
age, but not because they were resisting work requirements.  Rather, they 
were unable to navigate through the system effectively.123  And while the 
expressed goal was to encourage new employment, the early data shows that 
most of the individuals meeting the work requirement were those who had 
already been holding down jobs successfully prior to the implementation of 
the waiver.124  The automated withdrawal of coverage for individuals who 
failed to meet or stopped meeting the work requirements appeared to create 
coverage gaps that then generated uncompensated health care costs and 
worse health outcomes.125 
But were these mere bumps in implementation?  Even after the rollout, 
as noted above,126 individuals continued to fail to report their qualifying ac-
tivities, ultimately losing coverage.  For each month of operation in 2018, far 
more people who did not meet the work reporting requirement reported no 
activities than those who reported some activities. 
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TABLE 1. ARKANSAS MONTHLY REPORTING RESULTS 2018127 
Reporting Period 
(2018) 
Clients not 
Meeting Work 
Reporting 
Requirement 
Clients Reporting 
No Activities 
Clients Reporting 
Some Activities 
June 7464 7392 (99.03%) 72 
July 12,722 12,587 (98.94%) 135 
August 16,357 16,132 (98.62%) 225 
September 16,757 16,535 (98.68%) 222 
October 12,128 11,966 (98.66%) 162 
November 8426 8308 (98.60%) 118 
December 4776 4703 (98.47%) 73 
 
While Arkansas did not investigate the reasons for non-reports (individ-
uals who reported no work activities), the rate of non-reporting did not pursue 
the downward trend that one might expect for beneficiaries learning to navi-
gate a functional reporting system.  Whatever the new system was encourag-
ing, it did not appear to be substantially increasing the number of people who 
were managing to report some hours of work, even if not enough to fulfill the 
requirements. 
On March 25, 2019, the Kaiser Family Foundation published an addi-
tional report. The researchers found that 18,164 individuals lost coverage 
during 2018, and only eleven percent had reapplied for and regained coverage 
by the time the study was completed in March 2019.128 When the program 
began, only enrollees age thirty or older were subjected to the work require-
ment; as of January 2019, the requirement was expanded to include individ-
uals between ages nineteen and twenty-nine.129 
When enrollees lost coverage for not working, the sanction was gener-
ally imposed against enrollees who reported no work activities over the 
course of three months.130  The failure to report any work at all suggests that 
many of these enrollees were unable to create accounts within the system or 
unable to navigate the reporting system with their accounts.  The State, rec-
ognizing the large number of people removed by the automated system as a 
problem, made additional efforts to raise awareness about the policy changes, 
but the campaign could not penetrate into all of the communities with con-
centrations of potential enrollees.131  The State did allow reporting hours by 
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phone, an option not available in the version of the program implemented in 
the late spring of 2018.132  Despite these efforts, the report found that as the 
overall number of enrollees subject to the new work requirements increased 
by seventy-three percent from December 2018 to January 2019 (going from 
60,680 to 105,158),133 the State’s data shows the percentage of enrollees re-
porting having satisfied the work requirement shrank.134 
D. Early Federal Court Responses: Administrative Procedure and 
Congressional Intent 
The Arkansas plaintiffs had some reason for optimism.  As discussed in 
Section B, Kentucky’s effort to implement similar requirements met a sharp 
rebuff at the district court level in Stewart I in 2018.135  In March 2019, sep-
arate rulings invalidated work requirements again in Kentucky in Stewart v. 
Azar (“Stewart II”), 136 which had reapplied for its waiver after trying to cure 
the problems noted in Stewart I, and in Arkansas in Gresham v. Azar. 137  The 
same judge, Judge James Boasberg, elevated to the federal bench in 2011, 
wrote lengthy opinions in both cases;138 he also considered and resolved in 
the same way a challenge to New Hampshire’s program in Philbrick v. 
Azar.139 
The ruling in the Kentucky case, which thwarted Kentucky’s second at-
tempt to implement its waiver, determined on technical grounds that Secre-
tary Azar, in approving the waiver, had behaved in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner.140  While HHS was permitted to consider a waiver program’s posi-
tive impact on Medicaid’s fiscal sustainability, the federal agency could not 
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lose sight of Medicaid’s primary goal, which Judge Boasberg defined as 
“covering health costs.”141 
The Arkansas case worked in tandem with the Kentucky case.  In Ken-
tucky, the problem was one of federal administrative overreach that the 
State’s efforts could not justify.  Arkansas provided a further gloss on the 
problem by giving the court the opportunity to consider a different program 
with somewhat different justifications. 
The implementation in Arkansas also afforded the court the opportunity 
to consider the program as it operated, but Judge Boasberg’s analysis largely 
turned on how Secretary Azar had proceeded to approval.142  One significant 
consideration about its operation was not substantive, but rather a question 
of standing.  Arkansas denied that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the 
online reporting system because it had “changed its policy before this suit so 
as to allow reporting by phone or in person.”143  The court determined that it 
did not have to grapple with this consideration because of the overall prob-
lems with the program, but Arkansas’s raising of the issue suggested that this 
modification resolved a major implementation concern.144 
Judge Boasberg noted the same problems that provoked his ruling 
against the Kentucky program.  The Secretary, as he had with Kentucky’s 
waiver, identified Medicaid’s objectives as assisting in “improving health 
outcomes,” addressing “behavioral and social factors” related to health out-
comes, and incentivizing “beneficiaries to engage in their own health care,” 
failing to acknowledge that the overarching purpose of Medicaid is to fund 
the provision of “medical services for the needy.”145  This purpose, Judge 
Boasberg explained, demanded that the Secretary conduct a far more search-
ing analysis into claims by commentators that coverage losses would oc-
cur.146 
What, then, was required?  While not prescribing specifics, Judge 
Boasberg stated that, given the concrete and substantial warnings provided 
by expert commentators, “the agency must grapple with the risk of coverage 
loss.”147  The Secretary was not free to rely on Arkansas’s failure to predict 
losses, as the Secretary had an independent obligation to explain the rationale 
for rejecting this concern.148 
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The State nonetheless attempted to maintain the program on the grounds 
that interrupting it would be highly disruptive and confusing for program par-
ticipants.149  The court disagreed, ruling that even though Arkansas had al-
ready implemented its program, as with Kentucky, the appropriate solution 
was to vacate the waiver, terminating the program.  The court did not, how-
ever, entirely close the door for Arkansas, conceding that the State and HHS 
could work together in the future to produce a program that would meet the 
appropriate administrative standards.150 
New Hampshire’s waiver program, called “Granite Advantage”, which 
features even stricter work requirements than those implemented in Arkan-
sas, was approved by the HHS Secretary in November 2018, and the State 
took the first steps toward implementation in early 2019.151  New Hamp-
shire’s community engagement program, through which Medicaid recipients 
must meet their work requirement, launched in March 2019 and became man-
datory in June 2019.152  Advocates wasted no time, filing a class action suit 
on March 20 seeking an injunction against implementation of the program 
and the mandatory removals from Medicaid coverage slated to begin in Au-
gust.153  Like Arkansas, New Hampshire did not estimate how many individ-
uals were likely to lose health coverage through its work requirement.154 
The complaint against New Hampshire mirrors the successful strategy 
established in Stewart I.  It leads with a discussion of the policy changes the 
waiver accomplishes and then discusses extensively statements by Trump 
Administration officials indicating an interest in thwarting the ACA and re-
defining the purpose of Medicaid by soliciting the new round of waiver re-
quests.155  The plaintiffs further highlighted the Trump Administration’s 
commitment to promoting work requirements as a transformational compo-
nent for Medicaid in the proposed 2020 budget, which estimates that imple-
mentation across several states will save “$130 billion over ten years.”156 
                                                        
 149.  Id. at 183.  The court retorted somewhat acidly that the federal government and Arkansas 
had expressed strong confidence in Arkansas’s capacity to communicate the work requirement 
clearly to aid recipients.  Id. at 184.  
 150.  Id. at 183.  
 151.  Louise Norris, New Hampshire and the ACA’s Medicaid Expansion, 
HEALTHINSURANCE.ORG (Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.healthinsurance.org/new-hampshire-medi-
caid/. 
 152.  Granite Advantage Community Engagement Requirements Announced, CONWAY DAILY 
SUN (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.conwaydailysun.com/community/health/granite-advantage-com-
munity-engagement-requirements-announced/article_1e962caa-3527-11e9-b301-
e3e4917e8cc6.html. 
 153.  Complaint at 2, Philbrick v. Azar, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125675 (D.D.C. July 29, 2019) 
(No. 1:19-cv-00773-JEB). 
 154.  Id. at 20.  New Hampshire also eliminated a previously established form of retroactive 
coverage, but likewise did not analyze the impact of this change.  Id.  
 155.  Id. at 25. 
 156.  Id. at 31. 
   
166 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 79:145 
The New Hampshire plaintiffs articulated a different set of reasons than 
the Arkansas plaintiffs for struggling with the work requirements.  New 
Hampshire’s enrollees faced challenges not as much because of technical 
problems but rather because of the substantive difficulties in their lives and 
what counts and does not count as work.157  One New Hampshire plaintiff, 
Mrs. VLK, alleged that the reporting requirements would create problems for 
her, citing challenges in completing forms and acquiring and uploading doc-
umentation, but these allegations do not discuss technology or automated ter-
mination as a distinctive problem.158 
Judge Boasberg again considered the arguments, describing the issues 
in the case as “all too familiar.”159  He noted that New Hampshire’s work 
requirements mandated more monthly hours of work than enjoined programs 
in Kentucky and Arkansas, and the New Hampshire program required work 
from a broader age category than Arkansas Works.160  The Secretary’s con-
sideration of New Hampshire’s waiver failed to consider the ill effects of 
implementation in Arkansas, and the agency’s responses to concerns were 
“identical” to those the Court had rejected in its evaluation of Kentucky’s 
program.161  Despite the introductory discussion framing the dispute as 
largely following the path of prior litigation, Judge Boasberg analyzed the 
program and its justifications to support his conclusion that Secretary Azar’s 
approval of Granite Advantage was arbitrary and capricious.162  The Secre-
tary relied largely on New Hampshire’s statements about its intention to sup-
port the Medicaid provision rather than grappling with the copious expert 
evidence predicting coverage losses.  As Judge Boasberg noted, “Similar in-
tentions existed and corresponding protections were put in place in Kentucky, 
but the Commonwealth projected a coverage loss equivalent to 95,000 people 
losing Medicaid for one year.  Same with Arkansas, yet it found that nearly 
17,000 lost coverage at some point in the first six months alone.”163 
Neither the findings of negative outcomes nor the lawsuits have deterred 
other states, however.  By March 2019, the Secretary had approved work 
requirement waiver requests in Indiana, Wisconsin, Michigan, Maine, Ari-
zona, Ohio, and Utah in addition to the waivers discussed above.164  Alabama, 
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Mississippi, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Vir-
ginia have applications pending with HHS.165  West Virginia’s legislature 
also took the first steps to add West Virginia to the list.166  The court battle 
over waivers will continue; Judge Boasberg’s narrow rulings leave room for 
further reconfiguring of extant programs to try to nudge them toward legal 
acceptability, and the states moving forward are likely to attend to this advice. 
Recognizing the disruptive nature of this conflict, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted the Trump Ad-
ministration’s request for an expedited appeal of both Gresham and Stewart 
II.  The litigation should result in a ruling by the end of 2019.167  That ruling 
will likely identify the core question of whether the Trump Administration’s 
advocacy for and approval of programs implementing work requirements vi-
olates the Administrative Procedure Act, perhaps with some broader ques-
tioning of what constitutes an illegitimate administrative change to a statutory 
purpose.  Legal commentators will watch these cases closely to see if they 
might provoke Supreme Court interest down the road, as they raise important 
questions about administrative law, particularly administrations’ capacity to 
reconfigure legislative and previous administrative purposes. 
As the litigation evolves and increasingly focuses on these questions, 
however, it evades another important set of questions about what constitutes 
injury and how injury can be identified.  The plaintiffs in the cases lodge their 
claims of injury against the administrative approval of these programs but do 
so by objecting to the administrative understanding of the purposes of Medi-
caid.  This set of claims, while important, obscures another type of injury 
lodged in the programs themselves, addressed in the Section E. 
E. Digital Management and Digital Injury 
As the analysis above illustrates, the claims against Medicaid work re-
quirements are intertwined with implementation problems (or prospective 
concerns about what will happen when work requirements go into effect).  At 
first blush, these problems appear simply as a side effect of the reporting re-
quirements themselves.  Work requirements demand some form of verifica-
tion, of course, and opponents of work requirements would argue that even 
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if the system itself were relatively easy to navigate and did not create prob-
lems based on a perceived digital divide, the demand that people work itself 
undermines the core purposes of Medicaid.  As waiver programs have moved 
forward, states have clearly been attending to HHS’s failure to defend Ar-
kansas Works in court and the potential for such challenges.  Maine’s work 
requirement, while demanding more hours from Medicaid enrollees than Ar-
kansas Works, gives them a variety of options for fulfilling the reporting re-
quirement rather than insisting that it happen entirely online.168  In Michigan, 
while the primary means of administering the work requirement will be 
through self-reporting via an online portal, the State has also developed an 
expanded call center with automated reporting capability.169  Other states, as 
indicated in Table 2, have followed suit.  But all rely on a reporting system 
that penalizes enrollees for failing to log their hours through the designated 
means.  Furthermore, all provide mechanisms for automatic disenrollment of 
individuals who do not meet the reporting requirements.170 
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TABLE 2. APPROVED WAIVERS WITH WORK REQUIREMENTS 
State Date of 
Implemen-
tation 
Work 
Requirement 
Lockout 
Provision 
Reporting Status 
Ky.171 4/1/2019 80 
hours/month 
If annual 
eligibility not 
established, 
locked out for 
6 months. 
Online, by 
phone, or in 
person 
Enjoined 
Ark.
172 
6/5/2018 80 
hours/month 
If 
noncompliant 
for 3 months, 
locked out for 
remainder of 
calendar year. 
Online, by 
phone, or in 
person 
(added after 
implementa-
tion) 
Enjoined 
N.H.
173 
6/1/2019 100 
hours/month 
If 
noncompliant 
for 1 month, 
locked out until 
hours are 
completed.  
Online, by 
phone, by 
mail, or in 
person 
Enjoined  
Ind.174 Jan. 2019 1-6 months: no 
requirement 
 
7-9 months:  
5 hours/week 
 
10-12 months: 
10 hours/week 
 
13-18 months: 
15 hours/week 
 
18+ months:  
20 hours/week 
If 
noncompliant 
for 1 month, 
locked out for 
3 months. 
Online, by 
phone, by 
mail, or in 
person 
No 
litigation 
pending 
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Wis.
175 
Fall 2019 80 
hours/month  
 
48-month 
nonconsecutive 
time limit 
If still on the 
program after 
48 months, 
locked out for 
6 months. 
Not yet 
promulgated 
No 
litigation 
pending 
Mich.
176 
1/1/2020 80 
hours/month 
If 
noncompliant 
for 3 months in 
any 12-month 
period, locked 
out until 
compliant for 
at least 1 
month. 
Not yet 
promulgated 
Ques-
tioned by 
new 
governor 
Me.177 Implementa-
tion 
Cancelled 
20 hours/week If 
noncompliant 
for more than 3 
months in a 36-
month period, 
locked out. 
NA With-
drawn by 
new 
governor  
Ariz.
178 
1/1/2020 80 
hours/month 
If 
noncompliant 
for 1 month, 
locked out for 
2 months. 
Online, by 
phone, or in 
person 
No 
litigation 
pending 
 
The arguments plaintiffs have raised in the pending lawsuits tie back to 
the questions of administrative discretion and how far administrative agen-
cies can go in reinterpreting statutory purposes as they devise new rules for 
implementing statutes.  The injury is a procedural and democratic injury to 
the American people stemming from administrative failure to respect the will 
of the Congresses that passed the authorizing legislation defining the proper 
purposes of Medicaid.  Secondary harm occurs to state taxpayers, who suffer 
from the state’s own unwillingness to acknowledge and grapple with expert 
witnesses who predict harm from these policies.  The tertiary harm affects 
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the plaintiffs themselves who have lost access to their benefits, but their in-
jury is contingent upon the idea of administrative wrongdoing.  One gets the 
sense in reading the complaints and opinions that if Congress were to pass 
legislation declaring that shifting people from welfare to work was part of 
Medicaid’s core purpose, the challenges to work requirements, no matter how 
strict or how they were designed for implementation, would evaporate. 
The story of Medicaid work requirements, however, ties in with other 
implementation efforts relying on automated systems.  Putting work require-
ments in this context raises a different set of questions about how entitlement 
to government benefits should work and, to put it in simple terms, the amount 
of aggravation, delay, frustration, and error we can rightfully expect people 
to endure to gain access to statutorily granted benefits.  Herein lurks an inter-
esting equality problem, one that pushes us to question more deeply how 
democratic checks can function in an increasingly automated world.  It also 
presses us to look more closely at the relationship between equality and in-
tent.  We need to think more comprehensively about how disparities function 
and the extent to which reliance on automated systems shunts off claims of 
wrongs or injury into a corral of mere inconvenience. 
Such thinking, while not systematic, is already happening among some 
officials.  Michigan Governor, Democrat Gretchen Whitmer, was inaugu-
rated after CMS had approved a section 1115 waiver for Michigan to imple-
ment a work requirement program.  In her formal letter acknowledging the 
waiver and the responsibilities it imposed, she cited Arkansas’s experience 
of mass coverage losses and noted “Michigan’s statute is more sweeping than 
Arkansas’s waiver, threatening a broader range of adults with more exacting 
reporting demands.”179  She declared her intent to work with the legislature 
to adjust the program to improve its ability to “preserve coverage, promote 
work, and reduce red tape for Michiganders, while also minimizing adminis-
trative cost to the state.”180  While she did not go so far as to point the finger 
at automation itself as a problem, she recognized the damage strict reporting 
requirements and automated terminations can cause in an environment in 
which some of the most precariously poised individuals in a state are thus 
burdened and surveilled. 
Is automation actually a new problem?  Professor Virginia Eubanks ar-
gues—and I mostly agree with her—that it is not.181  Rather, it provides a 
new means of continuing long-established practices of distinguishing be-
tween the deserving and undeserving poor in ways that often result in racially 
disparate outcomes.  While algorithms themselves operate in a supposedly 
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arm’s-length fashion, they cannot remove human judgment and human bias.  
They merely conceal it.  As Professors Danielle Citron and Frank Pasquale 
note, “Because human beings program predictive algorithms, their biases and 
values are embedded into the software’s instructions . . . .  Scoring systems 
mine datasets containing inaccurate and biased information provided by peo-
ple.”182 
Automation does, however, raise some significant new issues, particu-
larly with regard to vulnerable populations, which the experience of Medi-
caid work requirements illustrates well.  And as Professor Eubanks notes, 
even if a basic sense of justice and fairness do not move policymakers to 
recognize these issues with respect to the management and surveillance of 
the poor, self-interest should come into play at some point.183  It may become 
difficult to draw bright lines around the kinds of problems that are increas-
ingly becoming routine for the poor, as anyone who has been through a strug-
gle over automated denials of health insurance claims can readily attest. 
It’s tempting to look at automated systems like the work reporting sys-
tem implemented in Arkansas and pinpoint the problem as one of faulty tech-
nology.  But even if the system itself had been designed to be more user 
friendly, had not experienced glitches, and had been highly accessible to its 
users, it raises serious concerns about how we as a society understand and 
manage access to health care for the poor.  The eager embrace of these sys-
tems underlines the collapse of the logic that drove the Supreme Court’s de-
mand for procedural fairness in Goldberg v. Kelly, presses the idea of access 
to health care as a benefit to be obtained in exchange for work, removes iden-
tifiable agents from the entire process of creating injuries, and reframes the 
beneficiaries of state-funded health insurance as the taxpayers who (very 
loosely) subsidize it, rather than the actual recipients.184 
Goldberg v. Kelly addressed welfare, not health insurance benefits, but 
the 1970 ruling brought the Supreme Court close to understanding public 
benefits as a form of property.  Justice Brennan’s opinion for the Court ruled 
that prior to terminating public assistance benefits, states were obligated to 
provide evidentiary hearings to recipients.185  Because the benefits were a 
statutory entitlement, the Fourteenth Amendment’s procedural due process 
required more than a cursory examination before benefits were withdrawn.  
The Court emphasized that form as well as function mattered.186  Denying 
that written appeals were sufficient, the Court explained: 
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Written submissions are an unrealistic option for most recipients, 
who lack the educational attainment necessary to write effectively 
and who cannot obtain professional assistance.  Moreover, written 
submissions do not afford the flexibility of oral presentations; they 
do not permit the recipient to mold his argument to the issues the 
decision maker appears to regard as important.  Particularly where 
credibility and veracity are at issue, as they must be in many ter-
mination proceedings, written submissions are a wholly unsatisfac-
tory basis for decision.187 
The opinion further emphasized the need for confrontation and cross-
examination of adverse witnesses as hallmarks of due process.188  In its rea-
soning, the Court was clear that terminations without review or consideration 
constituted wrongful behavior rising to the level of a legal injury for which 
the state had to proffer a means of redress. 
Fundamentally, the Court posited that some kind of deliberative consid-
eration was needed.  Individuals receiving public benefits were to be given 
the opportunity to discuss face-to-face the human circumstances of their case, 
to question and persuade, and to inject their individual perspectives into the 
machinery of consideration and denial.189  Scholars, most notably Professor 
Lucie White, have shown that the deliberative vision articulated in the 
Court’s opinion did not materialize from the ruling.190  Nonetheless, public 
benefit recipients learned to work within the system, often with the help of 
sympathetic caseworkers who could reformulate their messy narratives into 
claims that circumvented or short-circuited problematic results.191 
Goldberg v. Kelly, as applied to welfare, was undercut when Congress 
transformed the AFDC program to TANF, diminishing the limited property-
like aspects of benefits by making them temporally limited and more contin-
gent on work or other “productive” activities, but a sense remained that re-
cipients of public benefits had some vested interest in what they were receiv-
ing.192  Even under TANF, individual caseworkers handled cases and 
managed their administration, functioning to a limited extent as street-level 
bureaucrats, for all the good and ill that this model brings.  With regard to 
Medicaid, another major government benefit program for the poor, two 
forces have converged—the more general push toward modernization, in-
cluding automation, and the move toward work requirements. 
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Modernization, as Professor Eubanks and other scholars note, has taken 
place generally in benefits administration.  The targets for automation include 
“eligibility determination and case management systems; Web-based sys-
tems for submitting applications, reporting changes, and finding case status 
and notices; call centers . . . for reporting changes, giving case status infor-
mation, and conducting eligibility interviews; digitized document imaging; 
and business process reengineering.”193  Part of this transformation includes 
moving from a case worker-centered model “toward a model in which work-
ers perform designated functions.”194  And the ACA specifically encouraged 
automation: “Enhanced federal funding (i.e., 90 percent) is available for state 
Medicaid information technology (IT) upgrades to accomplish the streamlin-
ing and data sharing requirements.”195 
The new solicitation for work requirement programs has enhanced em-
phasis on monitoring and reporting through electronic systems.  On March 
14, 2019, CMS released new guidance to states employing section 1115 
demonstration programs mandating “regular reporting on key monitoring 
metrics upon implementation” and requiring states to “partner[] with an in-
dependent evaluator.”196  While the precise variables and collection methods 
are not specified, the reporting requirements create greater incentives for au-
tomating data collection and reporting and measure success based on the 
state’s own descriptions of its objectives.  As a blog post anticipating this 
development explained, states running programs were encouraged to think 
about data availability and quality in their program designs: “Where will the 
data to perform the evaluation come from?  Does the data structure allow for 
the analyses proposed in the evaluation?”197  These new reporting protocols 
do not contemplate requiring any direct connection to the central objective of 
providing access to health coverage. 
Lost in this push for automation and data collection is recognition of the 
problems, both in the initial implementation and in the long run.  With respect 
                                                        
 193.  Gina Mannix et al., How to Protect Clients Receiving Public Benefits When Modernized 
Systems Fail: Apply Traditional Due Process in New Contexts, CLEARINGHOUSE ARTICLE, Jan. 
2016, at 1, https://nclej.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/ClearinghouseCommunity_Mannixetal-
Published-Article-with-Copyright.pdf. 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  Id. at 1 n.2. 
 196.  Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs., CMS Strengthens Monitoring and 
Evaluation Expectations for Medicaid 1115 Demonstrations (Mar. 14, 2019), 
https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/press-releases/cms-strengthens-monitoring-and-evaluation-ex-
pectations-medicaid-1115-demonstrations. 
 197.  Kristin Allen, CMS Section 1115 Medicaid Demonstration Evaluation Requirements: Im-
plications for Designing Consumerism & Personal Responsibility Waivers, HEALTH MGMT. 
ASSOCIATES BLOG (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.healthmanagement.com/blog/cms-section-1115-
medicaid-demonstration-evaluation-requirements-implications-designing-consumerism-personal-
responsibility-waivers/. 
   
2019] UNCLAIMING AND REBLAMING 175 
to implementation, chaos and failure have quickly become expected out-
comes in shifts to automated systems.  The states proposing and adopting 
work requirements know that Medicaid recipients will struggle with report-
ing under the new systems.  They know, or should know, that the systems 
will fail.198  They recognize that individuals grappling to implement and work 
with the systems will struggle and fail to make them produce appropriate 
outcomes.  Judge Boasberg’s rulings take seriously the claim that demonstra-
tion programs did not consider the potential for large numbers of recipients 
to lose access to coverage.  He nonetheless frames this problem simply as 
one of administrative mismatch with the purposes of Medicaid. 
Further, both the states proposing these programs and CMS officials 
know that once fully implemented and running as intended, the systems will 
make discretion almost impossible to exercise.  Adoption of automation 
serves many purposes, including improving efficiency, linking information, 
and preventing fraud, and these purposes play major roles in the wave of new 
waiver approvals.  But in serving these purposes, automation transforms the 
programs themselves and the broader interests they supposedly serve.  Sys-
tems designed for fraud prevention, cost savings, and the removal of human 
judgment prioritize these interests to the point that they overshadow the Med-
icaid program’s aim to provide assistance to meet health care costs.  Indeed, 
as noted in Table 2, the systems are designed to lock people out for a variety 
of periods ranging from months to a lifetime, based simply on the automated 
determination of prior eligibility and access and failure to report the required 
number of work hours for the designated period. 
The problem thus runs deeper than criticizing the unwieldy nature of the 
systems themselves, the mistakes they make, or the difficulty that the target 
population has in using them, because these outcomes have no identifiable 
agents-as-wrongdoers other than the enrollees.  The problem then becomes 
the enrollees themselves.  Efforts, as witnessed by policy changes and litiga-
tion, focus on “fixing” the enrollees by doing more outreach, trying to edu-
cate them better about their responsibilities, and, albeit apathetically, provid-
ing more assistance to them in navigating the digital terrain.  Still, when 
resources are not forthcoming, the diagnosis comes down to their failure to 
meet the requirements, even if empathetic state agents recognize how diffi-
cult or impossible it is for them to do so. 
Because automation removes agency, it becomes much harder to iden-
tify injuries and wrongs to enrollees in legally cognizable terms.  In Indiana’s 
failed experiment with automation, after a lengthy and ugly court battle over 
whether the State or IBM was responsible for failure, Indiana’s Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the trial court’s ruling holding IBM responsible to the tune of 
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$78 million.  One of the attorneys representing the State, however, character-
ized the win as “a significant victory for Hoosier taxpayers.”199  This com-
ment, which echoed the trial judge’s lament situating Indiana taxpayers as 
the victims of the automation failure, underlines the invisibility of enrollees 
as individuals with rights that have been violated. 
There is no simple answer—automation is ubiquitous and will not be 
abandoned.  We should, however, move away from understandings of legal 
wrongs that require identifying individual malfeasors who intend to do harm, 
or at least have been negligent, in these kinds of situations.  It may be difficult 
to point an accusatory finger at an algorithm, but an automated denial of ben-
efits or a complicated digital system’s blocking access to health care can lead 
to bad outcomes that should be understood as legal injuries.  Scholars, poli-
cymakers, and the public need to reformulate our thinking to develop frame-
works moving to blaming and ultimately claiming state responsibility.  The 
first step, though, is to stop ignoring the real and consequential injuries that 
Medicaid work requirements are creating.  The harm is not just the damage 
produced to institutions like Medicaid by an administration eager to undo the 
will of Congress by approving policies that undermine legislation.  It is more 
urgently to enrollees who find themselves held accountable for the algorith-
mic damages that cheapen and threaten their very lives. 
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